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INTRODUCTION
A consensus has been growing in recent years that empirical legal
scholarship is an important tool for informing policy decisions.1 Empirical
study of legal concepts allows debate on fundamental questions that is
informed by the actual impact of law on behavior rather than conjecture and
an appeal to “common sense.” But despite the recognition and broader
acceptance of the benefits of empirical legal scholarship, many of the most
fundamental concepts of law such as incentives, deterrence, and even
justice, are not directly measurable and, therefore, have been overlooked in
empirical study. Fortunately, legal scholars can adopt the notion of
construct validation---the way psychologists overcome the difficulty in
measuring unobservable psychological phenomenon, called constructs---to
develop empirical tests that measure these unobserved legal models and
expand the current horizons of quantitative study of legal concepts. Using
the meta-theories of construct validation, researchers can infer the effects of
unobserved constructs and can thus modify foundational legal theories
based on empirical evidence rather than speculation. I propose a
standardized procedure based on current understandings of construct
validation that can be used to measure intangible legal constructs: 1)
develop generalized legal theories, 2) infer hypotheses from those theories,
3) design experiments to test the hypotheses, and 4) modify the general
theories based on the research results.
As a first step, researchers must develop theories about the effects of
law that are specific enough to provide direction for empirical testing, while
still taking a generalized perspective not confined to specific laws.
Generalized theories are necessary to allow multiple inferences to be drawn
that elucidate more detail of the unobserved latent variable being explored.
For instance, rather than developing a theory only about the impact of the
First Amendment, a more generalized theory will address the influences of
all constitutional rights. A generalized theory may state that populations
tend to exhibit more freedom when specific rights are embedded within that
nation’s constitution. Empirical studies of freedom of speech can then
provide particularized support for the broader constitutional theory, and can
also interact with studies of other rights.
1

See, e.g., Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top
Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006) (“Empirical legal scholarship (ELS) is arguably the
next big thing in legal intellectual thought.”); American Association of Law Schools
Annual Meeting: Empirical Scholarship--What Should We Study and How Should We
Study It? (Jan 3-7, 2006), available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/index.html; Lee Epstein
& Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Richard H.
McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction: Symposium: Empirical and Experimental
Methods in Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 791.
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Once a generalized theory has been devised, researchers can then
infer sets of hypotheses to test measurable aspects of those theories. For
example, based on a theory that constitutional rights lead to more freedom,
one might hypothesize that if a nation has a constitutional freedom of
speech then the media may produce more commentary disapproving of the
government. While the actual freedom that the press feels is impossible to
measure, the proportion of articles disapproving of government actions is
relatively easily to calculate. But a useful hypothesis suggests more than
just an empirical test; it also should have the potential to undermine the
theory. The necessity for critical hypotheses is borne from the current
philosophical understanding that theories can never be fully verified.
Hence, while empirical evidence that sustains a theory can reaffirm the
theory’s legitimacy, a critical hypothesis can serve one of two purposes: if
supported, the hypothesis can undermine an incorrect theory, but if proven
empirically inaccurate, that same hypothesis can help to rule out a potential
a criticism. By eliminating potential criticisms, a researcher can more
forcefully demonstrate the validity of the overarching theory.2
Next, the research must devise experiments that can test the
accuracy of the hypotheses. Ideally, experiments would use randomized
subjects for testing so that the results were likely caused by the treatment
being studied rather than a bias in the selection process. For instance, if a
researcher wanted to study the effects on prison terms of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, the researcher would most like to randomly assign
some convicted felons to be sentenced under the guidelines and an
equivalent group to receive sentencing without using the guidelines. But it
is often not feasible to randomize subjects on empirical legal studies for
practical, if not necessarily constitutional, reasons; most legal researchers,
therefore, use various forms of quasi-experimentation that allow testing
when subjects can not be randomized. Quasi-experimental designs allow
inferences to be made about causal relationships when randomization is not
feasible. The researcher wishing to study prison terms, for example, could
use a “time-series design” to analyze sentences that were dolled out both
before and after the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect.3 But because
2

Moreover, a researcher should not test only one hypothesis because the results from that
single test can be influenced by a questionable supporting theory rather than the one
targeted by the study. Each theory is supported by numerous auxiliary theories; for
instance, many current economic theories of law are based on Ronald Coase’s famous
theory of transactions, which in turn, relies in part on a rational-actor theory of behavior.
Hence, a test of a single hypothesis concentrated on a prevailing theory of law and
economics may uncover negative results, not because of a problem with the theory being
examined, but because of problems with the rational-actor model. But if only one
hypothesis is tested, this possibility may not be recognized.
3
Donald T. Campbell, et al., Quasi-Experimental Designs, in Methodology and
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the experiment is not truly randomized, the researcher needs to be careful to
identify plausible threats to internal validity (such as the possibility that
other changes in the law during that same time period affected sentences).4
These threats can be controlled by adjusting design elements or statistical
techniques to account for the threats.5 Finally, causal inferences can be
made when the results form a coherent pattern, either within the study or as
compared to outside knowledge.6
Once the various hypotheses have been tested, the overarching
theory should be modified to reflect the new knowledge gained through the
empirical data. The theory may have accurately predicted all the results of
the various experiments, in which case the theory is supported but no new
information is provided to the field. But if the theory’s predictions are not
completely accurate, the theory should be modified to incorporate this new
information. Theories are not falsified every time disconfirming data is
discovered, nor do fields go through seismic paradigm shifts where old
theoretical frameworks are thrown out in favor of an entirely new system.
Rather, through an iterative process of testing and retesting, theories about
unobservable legal constructs can be modified based on inferences from the
results of experimentation.
It is important to note, however, that empirical quantitative analysis
cannot supplant qualitative reasoning; while empirical results can help
inform legal policy-making, it is still necessary to debate and understand
theories on a qualitative level. For example, empirical testing could
indicate that torture could lead to improved intelligence gathering, but
society must still decide whether it can morally justify such tactics.
Similarly, evidence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment does not by
itself substantiate the penalty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part II examines the
development of philosophies of science to provide background of the
current understandings of theory development. Part III then describes the
history of psychometrics to demonstrate how psychology has applied
philosophies of science to overcome some of the same issues that empirical
legal scholarship is now facing. Finally, part IV details my proposed
approach for incorporating the most relevant aspects of this related field
into legal study.

Epistemology for Social Science191, 201 (1988).
4
William R. Shadish, The Empirical Program of Quasi-Experimentation, in Research
Design: Donald Campbell’s Legacy 13, 16 (Leonard Bickman ed. 2000).
5
Id. at 17.
6
Id. at 18-19.
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I. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Before moving on to describe a system for construct validation for
legal studies, it is first necessary to understand the philosophical
underpinnings on which those concepts are based.
A. Sir Karl Popper’s theory of verification and falsification
A common starting point when addressing the philosophy of science
is the philosopher Karl Popper’s idea of falsification; a theory is scientific if
it can be tested and has the potential to be proven wrong.7 The central
philosophical problem that concerned Popper was the difficulty of
demarcation: how is science distinguishable from pseudo-science? Popper
concluded that a true scientific theory should be corroborated through
exposure to empirical tests that have the potential of disproving the theory,
and a theory is better corroborated when it has survived more difficult
tests.8
Popper believed in an asymmetry between the ability to verify a
theory and the ability to prove a theory false; specifically, a scientific theory
can never be proven completely correct, but evidence that undermines a
theory can conclusively prove that theory wrong.9 Even a well-established
theory can be proven wrong at any time if contrary evidence is discovered.
For instance, we may believe that every time an object is dropped it will fall
towards the Earth, but even this theory could be falsified if the next item we
drop fell up. As a result, a hypothesis that can provide support for a theory
is never as useful as one that can undermine the theory because the former
can never prove a theory true, but the latter can definitively establish that it
is false. Scientists should concentrate, then, on testing negative hypotheses
because each time a negative hypothesis fails, one more potential criticism
has been ruled out and the theory has been further corroborated.
But critics of this philosophy have pointed out that if this philosophy
is correct, then history should be laden with critical studies that have
falsified the predominant theory of the time.10 But, in fact, most important
theories were falsified countless times before they were discarded.11 Under
a falsificationist view, some of the most important theories in history were
7

Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Karl Popper et al. trans., 2002).
Paul E. Meehl, Theoretical Risks and Tabular Astricks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the
Slow Progress of Soft Psychology, in Selected Philosophical and Methodological Papers 1,
18 (1991).
9
Popper, supra note 7, at 18-19.
10
Brendan Larvor, Lakatos: An Introduction 50 (1998).
11
Id.
8
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not actually scientific. Proponents of Popper’s philosophy, then, are forced
to distort history and arbitrarily label certain falsifying experiments as
“crucial,” while ignoring others.12
Popper’s idea that a theory can be completely discredited by any
negative evidence has been labeled a type of justificationism.13
Justificationists believe that a scientific theory can be fully proven by
empirical evidence.14 “In brief, [justificationism] is the view that the way
to criticize an idea is to see whether and how it can be justified.”15
Justificationsists believe that certain facts exist and if scientists can
establish that a particular theory does not reflect those facts, then the theory
should be discarded.16 For example, the premise of an argument may be
that all observable planets travel in an elliptical orbit, and the conclusion is
that all planets must travel in an elliptical orbit.17 For a justifcationist, this is
an invalid theory because it overstates the known facts. But for a
nonjustifcationist, the conclusion stated above may still have value to
science as an unjustified hypothesis rather than as a justified statement
about nature. By reversing the syllogism, the conclusion can be a stated as
a hypothesis, and the premises are data supporting the hypothesis. Now,
contrary evidence will not mean that the theory needs to be rejected
outright, but may need to be conditionally rejected or revised to reflect the
new data.18 This revision can proceed indefinitely as new information is
collected. Philosophy has generally moved away from the justificationist
theories, and philosophers now endorse various versions of
nonjustifactionism.19
B. Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Paradigm Shifts
One such nonjustificationist theory is historian Thomas Kuhn’s
theory of scientific paradigms. After researching the history of scientific
developments, Kuhn noted a distinction between mature and immature
sciences. In immature sciences, many competing schools of thought exist,
but no single idea dominates the field. Because an accepted theory has not
been adopted, scientists operating in immature fields base their research on
12

Id. at 42.
William Warren Bartley, III, The Retreat to Commitment 104-05 (2d ed. 1984).
14
Herbert Feigel & Albert Blumberg, Logical Positivism: A New European Movement, J.
of Philosophy 28, 281-96 (1931).
15
Bartley, supra note 13, at 186.
16
Id., at 186-87.
17
Id. at 191.
18
Id. at 196.
19
Greg Smith, On Construct Validity: Issues of Method and Measurement, 17
Psychological Assessment 396 (2005); Bartley, supra, note 13, at 194.
13
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many different schools of thought. But in exchange for this freedom to
choose their own theories, the scientists must give up the benefits from
relying on established research supporting the broad theory. Because no
accepted idea for a field exists, the scientists must reassert every basic
concept on which any new research relies. For example, before a single
concept for gravity was accepted, any publication of new research had to
start with a thorough explanation of the scientist’s particular perspective on
gravity and how those assumptions could affect the results. Hence, an
immature field moves along essentially at random because no controlling
force exists to direct future exploration. (This state of an immature field
also seems to describe the current state of legal academics. It is often
necessary to spend a significant portion of a law review article stating the
assumptions and background on which a new theory is based because,
without it, a reader will not know what school of thought and definitions the
author is employing).
But researchers in an immature science do not need to despair that
their field will flounder with no direction indefinitely; a science can mature,
not necessarily because of a new field-shattering discovery, but from a
theoretical proposal that is influential enough to persuade members of
opposing schools of thought. Once a controlling theory is accepted, mature
fields are then guided and driven by this single idea. For a new proposal to
bring about maturity in a field, then, the new idea must also be open-ended
enough so that future scientists have room to explore concepts controlled by
the idea. Kuhn labeled these driving forces “paradigms,” which specifically
are “a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in
their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications.”20
Essentially, a paradigm is an accepted worldview or framework under
which scientists explore their field. In mature sciences, paradigms do not
evolve slowly, but rather are subject to seismic transitions in thought, what
Kuhn called paradigm shifts.21 When scientists go about their day-to-day
work in a mature field they usually work within the dominant paradigm and
engage in “normal science,” which is “research firmly based upon one or
more past scientific achievements.”22 Most scientists in a field generally
subscribe to the same general paradigm, and perform experiments to define
the details of the paradigm. As the scientists discover new information they
adjust the prevailing theories to accommodate their results.

20

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 43 (3d ed. 1996).
Id. at 12-13. Prior to Kuhn, the word “paradigm” had been used only in connection with
grammar and linguistics. Since Kuhn’s adoption of the word to science, however, the
broader use of the word has become more prominently accepted.
22
Id. at 10.
21
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1. Normal science and the maturation of a field
Kuhn described the development of electrical theory as a typical
example of the maturation of a scientific field. Until the mid-eighteenth
century, the study of electricity floundered without a dominant paradigm.23
Before that time scientists did not agree on a unifying concept for electricity
and so each new experiment had to stand on its own accord without leaning
on previous research for support.24 As is common in other immature fields,
early researchers worked in one of many different schools of thought that
described some of the known physical properties of electricity, such as the
belief that electricity consisted of several different fluids, but no single view
could completely explain all empirical observations.25 Without a dominant
paradigm, facts could not be prioritized, evaluated, or criticized and
physicists did not have a basis with which to devise future experiments.
Development of the field proceeded with no direction and therefore
discoveries were made slowly and essentially at random.26 But in the mideighteenth century, Benjamin Franklin proposed that electricity may be a
single fluid consisting of positive and negative charges. Franklin’s theory
could explain more characteristics of electricity than any other theory of the
time, and it therefore grew to become widely accepted among other
researchers. It also suggested new avenues for future exploration and could
therefore guide scientists to conduct experiments that would lead to more
useful results.27
Kuhn suggests that Franklin’s fluid-theory for electricity was the
first dominant paradigm in the field.28 Once the paradigm was established,
physicists no longer had to waste time reexamining the basics of electricity,
and could begin to narrow their experiments to systematically explore the
details of the paradigm. Now that the field had matured, the scientists could
engage in the “normal science” of the time. Some of the discoveries by
eighteenth-century physicists could have been made only by operating
within this paradigm.
Kuhn postulated that each new fact uncovered through normal
science that supports the prevailing paradigm makes it more likely that
theory is correct. “Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or
23

Id. at 12-13. Other examples of paradigmatic works are Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s
Almagest, Newton’s Principia and Opticks, Lavoiser’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s Geology.
24
Id. at 13.
25
Franklin theorized that electricity was a fluid that operated differently under different
pressures. He said that electrical fluid under one level of pressure was “positive” and under
another was “negative.”
26
Kuhn, supra note 20, at 16.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 18.
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theory and, when successful, finds none.”29 As scientists continue to
engage in normal science, however, they may encounter anomalous results
that cannot be explained using the theories of the current paradigm. The
positive results are like a weight on a scale in favor of the existing
paradigm, and the negative results act like counterweights against the
existing paradigm. Kuhn argued that once an anomaly is uncovered,
scientists explore the anomaly. As more becomes known about the odd
event, researchers modify the existing theories to account for the new
information. Eventually, the anomaly will become a predictable part of the
current paradigm.30
In this way, Kuhn’s conception of normal science is in stark contrast
to Popper’s philosophy of falsification in which a negative result could
individually undermine an entire theory. According to Popper, scientists
constantly engage in critical experiments that test the very foundations of
their belief structure; their basic purpose was to disprove the underlying
assumptions and embrace contradictory evidence. To the contrary, Kuhn
believed that scientists almost never ask fundamental questions, but merely
accept the existing paradigm as a foundation for further research. Kuhn
provided the following example of an anomalous result being incorporated
into the existing paradigm: A scientist notices that while performing an
experiment on cathode rays, a screen in his lab has an unexpected glow;
further investigations of the anomalous glow then leads to the discovery of
an unknown form of radiation called x-rays that were not predicted by the
current paradigm.31 This scientist as well as other researchers then perform
research on the x-rays and adjust the existing theories to reflect the new
information. Scientists can now predict the occurrence and effects of xrays. What was once an anomalous result, is now a predictable part of the
dominant paradigm.
2. Paradigm shifts
But Kuhn believed that when enough anomalous results accumulate,
they can reach a critical mass that tips the balance of commonly accepted
theories away from the predominant view and throws the field into a state of
crisis. When a field is in crisis, it no longer operates under a common set of
beliefs, but instead resembles the immature state where scientists constantly
need to restate their basic assumptions to communicate a new idea.32 In a
time of crisis, scientists will begin retesting assumptions that had been
29

Id. at 52.
Id. at 52-53.
31
Id. at 57.
32
Id. at 72.
30
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widely-accepted, and a new competing paradigm may slowly develop.
Eventually, the believers in the new paradigm will challenge the hold-outs
from the older system and the better system will prevail. A better scientific
paradigm is one that accounts for more of the known data and more
accurately predicts future outcomes. For example, in the late nineteenth
century Newtonian physics and concepts of space failed to account for
increasingly accurate measures of movement of celestial bodies.
Astronomy’s inability to accurately predict celestial movement had pushed
the field into a state of crisis. This crisis only subsided with the publication
of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. When the new standard
prevailed, a “scientific revolution” or “paradigm shift” had taken place;
Einstein’s relativity theory was a paradigm shift away from Newtonian
physics.
Kuhn’s philosophy has drawn its own criticisms, however. First, his
ideas are not useful to predict future paradigm shifts.33 One cannot say ex
ante whether science is on the verge of a new paradigm shift. And if a
revolution does appear imminent, no one within the field is able to tell how
much more information is necessary to complete the transition. The
difficulty in prediction arises because Kuhn’s idea is based on historical
observations and can only be applied in an ex post position.
Other critics have attacked Kuhn’s idea that two paradigms in the
same field must be incommensurate, meaning scientists cannot hold to two
different worldviews at the same time.34 Kuhn believed that physicists
cannot simultaneously believe that Newton’s and Einstein’s theories are
both correct. The incommensurate component of Kuhn’s theory also
implies that it is not possible to prove whether the field is better off for
undergoing a revolution; the new paradigm may carry with it an entirely
new definition for the science.35 Kuhn did not believe that there is a “true”
scientific theory; merely that one theory may be a better predictor of future
outcomes.
This concept has been given the disparaging label of
36
“relativism.” Moreover, scientific discoveries do not actually develop in
well-defined leaps. Instead, they evolve slowly and at any given time many
scientists may believe aspects of both old and new theories. As even Kuhn
33

Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 875, 885 (2002).
34
See, e.g., Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, 47 Proceedings
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 5-20 (1973 - 1974) (attacking
the idea of conceptual relativism---the idea that reality is dependent on the framework with
which it is viewed. Davidson argues that supporters of a certain worldview can always
discuss other worldviews, and thus it is incoherent to claim that two views are completely
incommensurate).
35
Larvor, supra note 10, at 42.
36
Id. at 43.
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noted, scientists do not generally believe that they are developing a new
paradigm, but usually think they are simply building on established ideas.
C. Current Understandings in Philosophies of Science
Philosophers have come to understand that theories do not stand by
themselves, but actually rely on many supporting, or auxiliary theories.
Any theory about the interaction between celestial objects, for example, is
based on theories about gravity, inertia, mass, the make-up of the space
around the objects, etc. The success of any given theory therefore depends
on the truth of its auxiliary theories.37 Therefore, a negative result from an
experiment may indicate that a theory is false, but it could also mean that an
auxiliary theory is incorrect. Because a researcher confronting a negative
result can never be certain whether the result reflects the theory being
examined or a supporting concept, any particular theory is never fully
confirmed.
A key implication of this understanding is the importance of
criticism in theory development.38 Because a theory can never be fully
proven correct, criticism may be more useful than additional support. A
theory that describes all known events of a given phenomenon may not
necessarily be correct; other examples that the theory could not describe
may not yet have been discovered or a different theory may describe the
events even better. If scientists were to look only for more positive
examples that are described by the theory, they would supply little new
information for the field.
For example, Newton’s theories accurately
described the data known at his time, but as more accurate observations
were collected the theory’s flaws became apparent. If instead of looking for
supporting evidence, scientists attack a position critically they can rule out
potential criticisms and choose which of competing theories best describe
empirical evidence.
Legal academics have developed a similar method of continuous
critique and modification of theory. What sets the legal academy apart from
the sciences, however, is that the sciences have embraced the power of
empirical tests to support debates about theories. In contrast, law relies on
criticism of theory in a more abstract sense. This difference between law
and other academic fields results, at least in part, on the difficulty of
measuring legal concepts. Physicists can use a ruler to measure the distance
an object travels, anthropologists have developed sophisticated tests to
measure the age of relics that they uncover, and chemists can use scales to
weigh the product of a chemical reaction. But lawyers do not have a tool
37
38

Smith, supra note 19, at 397-98.
W.B. Weimer, Notes on the Methodology of Scientific Research, 40 (1979).
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that can measure civil liberties, security, or freedom. Lawyers seeking to
empirically test existing theory face the difficulty of figuring out what to
measure.
Fortunately, the complexities of measuring abstract concepts are not
unique to law, and are common in the social sciences. Psychology in
particular has developed sophisticated methods with which to measure
elusive notions such as when is a person actually depressed as opposed to
just sad. This subfield of psychology, called psychometrics, has developed
over the last century to help researchers deal with the difficulty of treating
concepts that are not easily quantifiable in a scientific manner.
II. PSYCHOMETRICS
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the scientific world was
still reacting to Darwin’s publication of On the Origin of Species by Means
of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle
for Life (commonly known as The Origin of Species). Today, his theory of
evolution proposed in the book is well-known. But less well-known is that
Darwin also concluded, based on this theory, that humans consisted of two
subgroups---savages and civilized---and the distinction between the two
was based at least in part on intelligence. Although Darwin could conclude
that some people must have advanced to a higher intellect than others, up to
that point no one could empirically test that conclusion.39 The challenge of
actually measuring a person’s intelligence intrigued many philosophers.
The difficulty arose because raw intelligence was an abstract trait of a
human mind and an obvious metric did not exist. The philosophers
eventually began testing other measurable traits that they believed would
have some correlation to intelligence; even if it was not possible to directly
measure how smart a person was, it was possible to estimate based on a set
of related characteristics. The first attempt at a test measured visual and
auditory acuity and several other psychophysical variables.40 Although the
specific metrics used in the first intelligence test turned out not to be very
accurate, the idea of using measurable traits to estimate an immeasurable
quality formed the basis of modern psychometrics.
Researchers expounded on this early work by attempting to find
characteristics with higher correlations to known indicators for intelligence,

39

Unfortunately, Darwin’s conclusion that that intelligence was a genetic trait also led to
misuse of the intelligence tests. The eugenics movement was based on the belief that the
quality of the human race could be improved by selective breeding based on the results of
intelligence tests.
40
John Rust & Susan Golombok, Modern Psychometrics, 5 (1999).
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such as to students’ grades.41 By the end of the first decade of the twentieth
century a consensus was achieved with regard to several testing techniques
for measuring intelligence, and a test developed by Alfred Binet was
practically applied for the first time to identify slower students in Paris
schools for assignment in “special” classes. Binet assembled a variety of
testing criteria into a single test that was easy to administer, and teachers
confirmed the accuracy of the test based on their own personal evaluations
of their students. The test was so effective that derivatives were used for
over sixty years to help identify the mentally retarded.42
A. The Introduction of Construct Validation
Since the 1950s, psychologists have been developing similar but
more sophisticated tests with which to measure other unobservable
phenomena, such as intelligence, depression, happiness, and other mental
characteristics. One of the key difficulties in assessing these traits,
however, is determining whether the tests are in fact measuring the correct
feature. In 1955, psychologists Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl articulated
the necessity of construct validity;43 validity is the degree to which a given
test actually measures the trait, or construct, that it is intended to measure.
They proscribed that “[c]onstruct validity must be investigated whenever no
criterion or universe of content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the
quality to be measured.”44 In other words, when faced with an abstract
concept with no convenient metric, an investigator must first find a
measurable criterion that can be used to approximate the concept. But it is
not enough to just find a single standard that may approximate the trait: it
must also be valid, which means it should closely correlate with the
construct being studied.45
Because of the inherent difficulty in determining whether a given
tangible criteria accurately reflects the value of the trait it is being used to
41

Pearson developed the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient for analyzing
the data.
42
In the United States, a version of the test called the Stanford-Binet was widely used. But
because psychologists struggled for an adequate definition for intelligence, experts could
not come to a consensus on what characteristics the tests were actually measuring. A.
Anatatasi, Psychological Testing, 5th ed. Macmillan, 67 (1982). By the 1950s, many
psychologists believed that the tests’ scores did not indicate anything more than the ability
to perform well on the tests themselves.
43
Lee J. Cronbach & Paul E. Meehl, Construct Validity in Psychological
Tests, 52 Psychological Bulletin (1955), reprinted in Paul E. Meehl, Psyhcodiagnosis:
Selected Papers 3 (1973). Meehl actually considered himself a neo-Popperian.
44
Id. at 5.
45
Id. at 3.
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estimate, Cronbach and Meehl suggested that researchers “bootstrap” their
way from a single criterion to achieve increasingly valid tests.46 Once a
valid criterion is found, it can be used to develop more valid tests.
Essentially, a test based on a valid criterion may become more accurate than
even the original criterion itself.47 For example, people first recognized the
physical quality of temperature because certain objects felt different than
others, and they used the sense of touch to measure this characteristic. But
early observers did not yet fathom that this feeling could be accurately
gauged or scientifically tested beyond simple feel. Researchers eventually
noticed, however, that when certain elements felt hot, they expand and
when they felt cool they contracted. Further, certain elements, such as
mercury, went through significant noticeable expansion and contraction
within the temperature range in which people lived. And the expansion
correlated well with the original test for temperature---feel. Most
important, though, was that the expansion correlated with not just one
person’s judgment of temperature but with anyone’s perspective. It turned
out that mercury was an even more accurate gauge of certain temperaturerelated events such as boiling and melting points than touch ever was. In
the end, scientists were able to use feel as a measurement for temperature to
bootstrap a more valid test using mercury. Similarly, Binet’s intelligence
tests were accepted because their results correlated well with teachers’
expectations about their students’ intelligence. In time, I.Q. tests were
viewed as a more valid measurement for intelligence than teachers’
expectations.48 The validity of more sophisticated I.Q. tests could later be
verified by comparing them to Binet’s test. But as these examples
demonstrate, a test---like a scientific theory---can never be proven
completely valid, and establishing validity must be an ongoing process.
It became apparent that like Popper’s philosophy of falsification, a
vital component of construct validation is review and criticism.49 Without
critical assessment, a measurement’s validity can never be confirmed
because it would not be compared to other known indicators. And when a
metric cannot be tested through observable events, supporters may be
tempted to rationalize its effectiveness. Cronbach and Meehl warned
however that “[r]ationalization is not construct validation;”50 researchers
must develop hypotheses that critically test the measurement and a single
hypothesis alone is not sufficient.
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B. Modern Understandings of Construct Validation
Using a method called the multi-trait multi-method approach,
(“MTMM”) a researcher can further validate a metric by not only observing
factors that should have positive correlations with the test, but also
investigate factors that should be unrelated to the trait if the theory is
correct.51 By using this approach, the validity of a test can be determined
by measuring several traits---some that should have high correlations with
the construct being studied and some that should not--- and by using several
different methods. This way a researcher can ensure that the results are an
accurate reflection of the trait being studied and not a reflection of a related
trait or an artifact from a particular experimental method.52
To illustrate, consider a researcher who wants to assess a theory
regarding mathematical reasoning and requires the use of a new test for
math skills.53 To determine whether the new test is correctly measuring the
proper traits, the researcher hypothesizes that the test is valid if the results
correlate well with older, accepted tests. But even though the researcher
may be correct that a high correlation can indicate validity, this relationship
alone is not definitive. Without more information it is impossible to
determine whether the test is truly measuring only math skills, or if an
unrecognized third factor, such as reading skill, is actually influencing both
the score on the old test and the new. Hence the researcher must develop
and test additional hypotheses regarding the possible influence that reading
or other skills may have on the new test. If further observations reveal that
the test’s results have a high correlation with previous math scores, but an
even higher correlation with previous reading scores, then the test is
probably not a valid measure for mathematical reasoning alone. Rather, the
test may actually be measuring reading skills, and those people who are
better able to read the problems may score higher than those with better
math abilities simply due to a better understanding of the test. But without
critically exploring this alternate hypothesis, the researcher would have
based future research on a potentially invalid test.
If, after testing, the researcher discovers that the hypothesis is not
supported, a reexamination of the overarching theory is necessary. But this
examination is not simple; scientific theories are often based on many
auxiliary theories.54 Results can also be affected by elements of the test
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itself.55 Hence, when empirical observations do not conform to theoretical
predictions, the negative results do not necessarily mean that the theory is
wrong.56 Instead, it may be that the theory is correct and the test is not
accurate. On the other hand, it is possible that the test is accurate and the
theory is not completely correct, that both the theory and the tests are not
adequate, or that the auxiliary theories are wrong. Unfortunately, because
of these ambiguities, even if the hypothesis is supported, the researcher still
cannot be completely confident in the theory.57 Once again, it is necessary
to test the supporting theories in addition to testing the theory of interest.58
When an experiment does confirm a hypothesis, the positive results
can help establish the test’s validity, but Cronbach and Meehl originally
claimed that the test cannot last in the face of negative results.59 In this
way, their conception of construct validity resembles Popper’s theory of
verification.60 But just as philosophers moved away from Popper’s
justificationist view, psychologists have realized that tests are not fully
invalidated in the face of negative information. Rather, measurements must
undergo constant revision.61
To validate a test of a construct, psychologists can follow a five-step
method.62 First, a theoretical construct, such as intelligence or happiness,
should be specified. Next, an informative hypothesis should be developed
that will add to the knowledge of the field rather than reaffirming existing
ideas. Then research experiments can be designed that critically test the
hypothesis and the data’s correlation with the hypothesis’s predictions can
be calculated. Finally, the theory should be revised to reflect the new
knowledge gained from testing the hypothesis. Under this method, theories
constantly evolve to reflect the updated knowledge of the field.
III. MEASURING UNOBSERVABLE LEGAL CONSTRUCTS
Sciences that involve abstract concepts (in particular, the social
sciences) share the common obstacle of measurement that is now
confronting those wishing to approach legal questions scientifically. But
because this dilemma is common among many different fields, legal
scholars are able to use the experiences from the other fields to overcome
these issues. This interdisciplinary approach is based on the idea of
55
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consilience, which is the “‘jumping together’ of knowledge by the linking
of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common
groundwork of explanation.”63 It is the idea that when one studies all levels
of scientific phenomena, similar principles can be discerned; distinct fields
of study may not be as discrepant as one might expect. For example, one of
the most prevalent of these similarities is that many fields decide among
multiple possible explanations for a given outcomes by using Occam’s
razor, which states the principle of parsimony; essentially, parsimony refers
to a preference for the least complex explanation for a given outcome.
Because of these underlying symmetries between fields (such as Occam’s
razor) it is possible to solve some of the most complex problems in one
field by integrating the knowledge from other disciplines.
Accordingly, I propose extending the concept of construct validation
from psychology to law. Construct validity looks for convergence and
divergence of operations to make inferences about latent variables based on
measurable traits that are influenced by the construct. For example, while
happiness is unobservable, it is possible to measure happiness by measuring
behaviors such as the number of times people smile or the frequency of
complimentary statements.
Similarly, while deterrence may be an
unobservable legal construct, it is possible to infer that a law has had a
deterrent effect by measuring the frequency of unwanted behaviors or the
number of arrests. As mentioned in the introduction, however, it is
important to remember that empirical observations should not be the sole
basis for policy decisions. Even if a supported theory predicts a certain
outcome, lawmakers must still decide whether those laws comport with the
societies qualitative values.
The method I propose primarily involves four steps: first, a
researcher must develop generalized theories about the influence of law on
society. Generalized theories should predict behavioral outcomes that one
would expect as the result of a given type of law. Because unobservable
legal constructs can only be empirically studied by noting divergent and
convergent operations, a generalized theory should suggest as many
different operations as possible; as more operations are tested, confidence in
the presence of the latent variable should increase. Second, based on the
theory, the research must infer hypotheses that can challenge and provide
useful information about the theory and specify operations to test
hypotheses. Although many legal empirical studies have devised and tested
hypotheses, some do not, and even fewer test rival hypotheses or address
possible weaknesses in an accepted theory.64 But, as explained above,
experiments that simply reaffirm a hypothesis are much less informative
63
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than those that address criticism of the theory.65 Third, the researcher
should design quasi-experiments that can infer causal relationships even
when the subjects being studied cannot be randomized. Finally, the original
theory should be revised to incorporate inferences drawn from the new
empirical information gained from the research.66 The remainder of this
article will more fully develop each one of these steps.
A. Developing Generalized Theories
The first step in measuring unobservable legal concepts is to
develop a generalized theory that allows multiple inferences to be made
about the unobservable construct.67 All theories are not created equal; that
is, a hierarchy exists among theories in which some are more elemental and
apply to specific situations, while other more generalized theories, involve
concepts that can be tested under multiple conditions. For instance, a
researcher studying a new educational model could devise a basic elemental
theory that a certain student will perform better on tests if the new model
were in place because she has been receptive to similar educational models.
Unfortunately, this theory provides little information because the results are
very specific and is affected by the student’s particular characteristics.
Hence, inferences that can be made about the quality of the program in a
larger population are limited. A more generalized theory addressing how
the curriculum will affect the entire class becomes more interesting; it
allows the researcher to asses the program using multiple operations, rather
than a single test. Hence, if a convergence of data occurs (namely, that a
majority of the class improves after being subjected to the treatment), a
stronger inference can be made about the quality of the program. But the
class may still have its own individual traits that can influence the results as
well, and an even more generalized theory regarding the effect of the new
educational model on the entire school can provide still more information.
Similarly, generalized theories about law can provide the best information
about the influences laws can have on a population by allowing more
inferences to be drawn about the legal construct.
Legal academics are skilled at developing and debating legal
theories, but often the theories tend to be elemental, in that they are limited
to the application of specific laws or concepts. Professor Thomas Ulen has
pointed out, however, that a common attribute in most sciences is that
theories are universally applicable without regard to specific governmental
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institutions.68 In addition to the multiple inferences that can be drawn from
generalized theories, disciplines that rely on generalized theories also have
the advantage of better communication and more focused study across
boundaries; scholars are able to address common issues and share their
findings without regard to their personal location.69 In economics, for
example, researchers around the world share the same basic theoretical
principles---such as the rational-actor theory---that allow their hypotheses to
apply generally.70 Because economic research is often based on generalized
theories, economists in India can share their research with Americans
because both groups speak the same theoretical language.
In contrast, law does not have accepted general theories that
transcend political boundaries and form a theoretical paradigm within which
legal researchers can more easily communicate across borders. Rather,
legal scholars focus on more elemental issues that affect their particular
government.71 More productive theories, however, address generalized
concepts that are amenable to empirical measurement because they allow
researchers to use multiple techniques to explore the theory. An empirical
legal scholar studying an elemental theory about a single law passed in a
small community can run only a limited number of experiments to explore
the effects of the law. For example, the community can be analyzed both
before and after the law was passed or the community can be compared
with similar communities that do not have the same law (experimental
design will be discussed more thoroughly below). In contrast, generalized
theories about a class of laws allow multiple approaches for researchers:
multiple communities with different laws within the class can be explored
or the effect of that class of laws can be studied within the same
community. While these same experiments could be conducted without a
generalized theory, they would progress in a state similar to what Kuhn
described as an immature science in that they would lack cohesion that
could provide focus for future study. The theory could provide that
cohesion and suggest potential follow-on research.
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1. Drawing international interest in interesting topics
A general theory can draw more interest than an elemental theory,
and can advance the current knowledge for the field more quickly and
robustly.72 By developing theories that address interesting and widespread
issues, they are more likely to draw commentary, which can foster a
developing community for scholars to knowledgeably debate each others’
work. This community of critical discussion is especially important in law,
which lacks significant peer-reviewed journals. In other fields, studies are
vetted for publication by experts based on the quality of the research and the
logic of the conclusions. And despite calls for a change, law currently lacks
this filter. Hence, the only way under the current regime to ensure quality
work is through discussion and debate. If a study produces controversial
results, others can evaluate the methods and comment on the conclusions.
This way, well-executed studies can be celebrated and cited, while lower
grade experiments will be undermined by criticism and eventually relegated
to obscurity. The best way to encourage the growth of these essential
debates is for legal scholars to frame their theories in ways that are not
limited to a specific statute or legal doctrine, but to question how the
concept behind a law can result in observable behavioral alterations
throughout a population.
In contrast to science, the elemental theories often investigated in
law rarely attract interest across national boundaries.73 While other social
sciences benefit from diverse commentary from scholars internationally,
legal debates tend to remain imprisoned within political boundaries.
Professor Ulen argues that “there is no persuasive case for ‘legal
exceptionalism’---i.e., for the view that law is inherently different from
other academic disciplines that characterize themselves as scientific.”74 The
obvious benefit from garnering increased attention beyond national
boarders is that more people can provide useful commentary, insight, and
critical analysis of an idea. Legal experts in other countries may be able to
provide differing perspectives on an issue and help provide a more nuanced
view of the problem.
Psychology Professor Greg Smith describes how the psychological
theory of self-enhancement (the tendency to concentrate on one’s own
strengths rather than weaknesses) was reworked based on information
acquired through multicultural study.75 Initially, psychologists believed
self-enhancement was universal, but cross-cultural testing showed that
72
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inhabitants of some Asian cultures failed to demonstrate the trait.76 After
further investigation, the researchers learned that members of these cultures
did, in fact, self-enhance, but they exhibited the trait in a different manner:
while members of individualistic cultures focused on individual behaviors,
members of collectivist cultures placed more weight on collectivist
behaviors (e.g., defending decisions made by the group).77 The critical
study of diverse cultures provided information that showed errors in the
assumptions that supported the theory of the universality of selfenhancement in ways that domestic studies could not. The result of
observing these varying conditions was a more detailed and complete
understanding of the field.
This example also illuminates the nature of auxiliary theories:
general theories depend on the validity of auxiliary, or supporting,
theories,78 and negative empirical data could be the consequence of faulty
auxiliary theories rather than failures in the theory being examined.
Theories that can be tested in other cultures can be used to undue this
ambiguity by allowing international commentators to highlight the possible
assumptions on which the theory is based. But despite the benefits of crosscultural study, current legal research is limited almost exclusively to
national issues and cases decided in United States courts. And while that
research is certainly beneficial, like the situation with self-enhancement in
psychology, some commonly held beliefs in law may be misguided because
they are based on particular American qualities.
For example, most criminal law scholars agree that increasing
mandatory prison sentences leads to decreasing unlawful behavior. As a
result, when legislators became concerned about the spread of crack
cocaine, they increased the mandatory sentences for selling crack as
compared to powder cocaine. But it may be possible that Americans have a
particular aversion to longer prison terms. Although the possibility seems
unlikely, in other communities the very idea of being sentenced to spend
time in prison alone may be such a significant deterrent that a mandatory
minimum ten year prison sentence will do little more than a one year
sentence. By performing cross-cultural studies examining the effect of
longer prison terms on the sale of crack cocaine, researchers can determine
whether the influence increased punishments have on unlawful behavior is a
universal constant or if it is a particular cultural trait. This knowledge can
then inform decisions about future sentencing changes in the United States
as well as other countries.
76

Id.
Id.
78
I. Lakatos, Lectures on scientific method, in I. Latakos & P. Feyerabend (Eds.) For and
Against Method 19-112) University of Chicago Press (1999).
77

7-Sep-06]

Legal Construct Validation

22

2. An example in constitutional law
The derivation and benefit of a generalized theory can be seen
through an example posed by Judge Richard Posner, who suggested
questions about constitutional law that he would like to see explored
empirically.79 The first question he posited was “What difference has it
made for press freedom and police practices in the United States compared
to England that we have a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights and England
does not (or at least did not, before it became subject to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)?”80 Any
researcher attempting to empirically answer this question will quickly
confront the difficulty in measuring “freedom of the press.” As a first step
in empirically answering this question, then, one could pose a generalized
theory that countries with explicit constitutional guarantees tend to express
freedoms more vibrantly than countries that have not made express
constitutional rights. Put this way, the question about the freedom of the
press in the United States versus England becomes an elemental component
of a more general question about constitutional law and its influence on
societies.
Posing a theory in such a broad manner is helpful for several
reasons. The first is the benefit gained from inviting a larger audience to
comment. In addition to attracting First Amendment experts to the issue,
scholars in various aspects of constitutional law may also become engaged
in the debate. And as the study of this question draws more commentary,
more ideas will be generated that help drive the field; critics may run tests
in an attempt to undermine the theory, while supporters may try to replicate
the outcome of a positive test or otherwise defend the theory. In the end, a
rigorous debate can develop with perspectives beyond the confines of First
Amendment debate and the theory will become more refined and more
accurate as empirical knowledge is acquired.
Another significant benefit from addressing the elemental question
about the First Amendment as part of a more generalized issue is attention
from abroad. Because the theory does not specifically address any one
nation, legal scholars in other countries may have input as well.81
International legal experts may have the ability and experience to bring
nuanced insights to the theory in the same way that cross-cultural
experiments allowed psychologists to refine their theories about selfenhancement. For instance, researchers may compare not only the United
States and England, but also China, which specifically restricts speech and
79
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the press. Analysis can also be done on certain Middle Eastern countries
that allow only state run press organizations. Perhaps, by empirically
studying the varying relationships between governments and the local press
(from constitutional freedoms to constitutional controls), scholars will be
able to refine their understanding of the effects of constitutional rights in
general.
Finally, the generalized theory about constitutional rights can create
a unifying concept that can draw together studies that would otherwise run
without direction. Studies of the Fourth Amendment’s protection from
search and seizure can be compared to the First Amendment’s protection for
the press. Also, studies conducted in other countries that explore their
particular constitutional system do not have to stand in isolation, but can be
contrasted with their American counterparts. And, like Kuhn’s paradigms
for science, the generalized theory of constitutional rights will suggest
future empirical legal work to progress the current understanding of
constitutional rights.
3. An example in intellectual property law
Intellectual property (IP) provides an example of a law that is
derived from generalized theories about incentives and rights, and has been
extensively debated without regard to national borders. The basis of
intellectual property laws are generally attributed to one of two basic
theories: natural rights or utilitarian.82 The theory of natural rights,
developed during the Enlightenment, states that IP rights are an inherent
part of the laws of nature---creators should own their creations. In contrast,
according to the utilitarian theory, IP is a legal right needed to provide an
incentive for citizens to create; the public will forgo some of its ability to
use new innovations by allowing its government to provide a limited
monopoly right to creators, thereby providing a financial incentive for the
creation. Utilitarians believe that without IP law, innovations will not be
utilized at their most efficient levels. The American system of IP derived
primarily from the utilitarian model, but debate continues as to the extent
that the limited monopoly is necessary to drive invention.
Many of the most recent modifications to copyright law in particular
tend to provide increasing protections for creators. For example, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) makes criminal tampering with
effective encryption devises that protect copyrighted material, even if the
encryption also prevents access to material that is not copyrighted or if the
person wishing to gain access may intend a legitimate fair use of the
82

Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright
Law, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2005).

7-Sep-06]

Legal Construct Validation

24

copyrighted work. The Supreme Court has also recently allowed a twentyyear extension to the length of most copyrights. Opponents of these laws
have argued that these additional protections were unnecessary because the
existing laws provided sufficient incentives for artists and other innovators.
It is impossible to directly measure the “incentive” created by IP
rights, but because of the generalized theories on which they are based it is
possible to infer the degree the laws influence creation by empirically
exploring the multiple traits that the incentives influence. For example,
because patent law has a standard duration for all inventions regardless of
the development cycle of the product, it is possible to infer the influence of
the law by comparing the frequency with which inventors patent in different
industries. In the pharmaceutical industry, for instance, the life cycle of a
product often outlasts the life of the patent thereby decreasing the financial
benefits that the innovator can obtain by exploiting their monopoly rights.
But in the computer industry, new innovations become obsolete long before
the monopoly rights expire, so the inventor can optimize their profit for the
life of the product. It is possible to compare the patenting practices in these
two industries, in which IP law provides varying protection, to learn more
about the actual incentives the law provides.
Cross-cultural studies of intellectual property could provide similar
benefits. American IP laws are based largely on the belief that people are
more willing to create if they receive a financial incentive for their work.
But again, the fact that Americans seem to produce more when they are
given stronger intellectual property rights may be a reflection of the
country’s reliance on capitalism to reward positive behaviors. In socialist
societies, citizens may feel stronger motivations to innovate to provide
greater benefits for the community, rather than for individual gain. By
studying the influences of intellectual property laws in other countries,
researchers can gain a fuller understanding of these effects.
B. Infer multiple critical hypotheses
Because generalized theories do not apply to single law, they allow
researchers to infer multiple critical hypotheses to make more detailed
inferences about an unobserved legal construct. Latent variables cannot be
determined from testing one hypothesis alone; they can be measured only
after detecting trends of convergence and divergence of multiple operations
conducted to test multiple hypotheses.83 As researchers accumulate
evidence in support of a theory by testing the multiple hypotheses,
83
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confidence in the theory can increase.84
As a concrete example, consider how astronomers study an
unobservable singularity, commonly known as a black hole. Singularities
do not reflect light, radio, or other signals, so it is impossible to directly see
or hear them. But astronomers have still been able to examine several
throughout the galaxy. To do this, they first surmised the possibility of such
celestial bodies based on theoretical considerations. They then could
deduce that if such a body existed with a strong gravitational pull, then
observable objects in the surrounding area should be influenced.
Astronomers were then able to scour the skies to look, not for the holes
themselves, but for their effects on surrounding bodies. When astronomers
noticed that a star moved in an irregular pattern, they could hypothesize that
the irregularity may have been caused by the gravitational force of an
unobserved body---possibly a singularity. But even if the influence is the
singularity, it is still impossible to determine exactly where it is, how large
it is, or how strong the gravitational pull. If multiple observable bodies
were affected in the same area, however, then it may be possible to
“triangulate” details about the unobserved object without ever being able to
detect it directly. For instance, if orbits for several different objects were
pulled in the same direction but at different severities, it may be possible to
infer an approximate location for the singularity. But, just as a theory can
never be proven completely true, astronomers cannot truly confirm the
existence of a singularity because it can never be directly observed.
Unobserved legal constructs can similarly be inferred based on their
influence on observable operations. And while a single operation may
indicate the possibility that the unobservable trait exists, only after testing
multiple hypotheses is it possible to reliably triangulate the details.
Moreover, by testing a larger number of hypotheses, more information
about the unobservable trait can be gained. For example, a generalized
theory may state that capital punishment deters violent crime, and a
researcher may infer the hypothesis that a state that employs the death
penalty should have a lower rate of violent crime then one without it. But
just like a single irregular orbit does not provide enough information to
study a singularity, the mere decrease in violent crime does not provide a
full picture of the deterrent effect of certain punishments. The crime rate
may have been influenced by a third factor, such as an up-tick in the
economy that created more jobs for the unemployed who may have
otherwise resorted to violence. Hence, to establish the validity of the
deterrence theory, the researcher must also test hypotheses that economic or
other factors influenced the crime rate. And although the theory can never
84
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be proven completely true, as more hypotheses are tested, the validity of the
theory can become more certain.
But this example also demonstrates the necessity for critical
hypotheses. Because the deterrent value of capital punishment can never be
completely established, a powerful set of hypotheses does more than simply
reinforce a theory. A hypothesis that, if proven, supports an existing theory
can provide more confidence in that theory. Conversely, a hypothesis
designed to address criticism of the theory or help choose between
competing theories can provide more valuable information; if such a critical
hypothesis is supported based on statistical analyses, then the community
learns that the theory may be false. But if the hypothesis fails, critics have
one less avenue through which to attack the theory. Powerful hypotheses
eliminate as many criticisms as possible, and a hypothesis that completely
undermines a critique can provide the strongest possible evidence in support
of the theory. Hence, a powerful set of hypotheses for legal concepts will
suggest experiments that can help rule out as many criticisms as possible.
For example, with regards to the theory about deterrence, a researcher may
test the hypothesis that economic conditions in a state with capital
punishment are actually responsible for any difference in observed crime
rate.
1. Operationalization
Before hypotheses can be tested, however, the legal constructs being
examined must be defined. Many terms have different meaning for
different people; for instance, when in 1964 Justice Potter Stewart was
called on to define obscenity under United States law, he famously wrote
that he’ll know it when he sees it.85 But for an empirical legal scholar
trying to study the effects of a new law or Supreme Court case on the
amount of obscenity, a more useful definition is necessary. A more
functional definition for research may be that obscenity contains frontal
nudity or explicit sex acts. Based on this definition, anyone can determine
if a film is obscene. While others may not necessarily agree with this
definition, they will be able to understand and assess research that uses it.86
Clearly defining a concept in a way that it can be measured, a
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process called operationalization, is a vital component to quantitative
science.87 Operational definitions are descriptions of variables or constructs
in terms of the specific validation tests used to measure them, rather than in
terms of an intrinsic essence.88 For example, weight may be defined as the
result of putting an object on a scale and temperature may be defined as the
reading on a thermometer.89
In psychology, mental retardation is
operationally defined as a score of 70 or lower on an I.Q. test.90 Happiness
can be defined in terms of facial expressions (such as smiling), tone of
voice, and other observable characteristics; thus, if psychologists wish to
measure whether certain treatment makes someone happy, they can count
the number of times a person smiles in a given time-period after the
treatment is administered.
Once a construct has been empirically studied, it may still be
necessary to adjust the operational definition if the results do not correlate
with expected operations. For example, the term “genius” may be defined
by a certain IQ score, but experts also expect geniuses to score well on
achievement tests in school. If studies were to find, however, that students
with genius IQs performed poorly on achievement tests, then the term
genius may have to be redefined using a measure other than IQ score. In
law, if obscenity was defined as the proportion of a film’s screen time
devoted to showing nudity, but films that meet this definition of obscene do
not also contain a higher than average number of sex acts, then the term
obscenity may need to be redefined.
Although law schools do not currently provide much training on
how to analyze complicated statistical problems, lawyers are particularly
trained in how to define difficult concepts. When interpreting a statute,
lawyers argue the meaning of particular words or concepts. In applying
judicial decisions, lawyers must determine how to apply the idea put forth
in previous cases to the facts of a new problem. The skills required to
determine the precise definition of an ambiguous statute or the application
of a complicated legal rule are similar to those required to define an abstract
idea.
2. Hypotheses for the constitutional rights example
Turning back to Judge Posner’s question about the degree of liberty
provided to the American press due to the First Amendment and our theory
87
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that freedoms explicitly proscribed in a constitution will provide more
liberty, one notes immediately the difficulty in directly measuring the term
“freedom”. Although many scholars have debated the true meaning of the
word freedom, empirical research requires an operational definition. Hence,
it is necessary to operationalize the term before hypotheses can be inferred
to test the theory. One possible definition for freedom of the press is the
proportion of stories and editorials that are critical of the present
government versus the overall number of stories published. Conversely, in
a country with less freedom of the press, reporters will be more reluctant to
say anything negative about the presiding national rulers for fear of possible
repercussions.
Once freedom is defined by the number of unfavorable stories
towards the government, hypotheses can be inferred to test the theory. For
example, one might hypothesize that the United States will exhibit more
freedom than England because of the constitutional protections for the
press. Hence, to test the hypothesis an experiment might analyze the
proportion of critical stories in the American press versus the British media.
But just as a single irregular orbit is not sufficient to identify a singularity,
this single hypothesis cannot support the theory alone. To more completely
test the theory, a researcher must develop several hypotheses that can
eliminate potential criticisms and help choose between alternate theories.91
For instance, a critic may point out that the proportion of critical stories
may actually be a reflection of an unpopular regime or a general cultural
attitude towards authority. It is thus necessary to devise several hypotheses
that can help establish the theory.
A more complete set of hypotheses to test freedom of the press
would include the one dealing with stories critical of the government, but
may also include other hypotheses. One hypothesis may be that any
difference in disapproving reporting is the result of an unpopular
government. To test this hypothesis, a researcher may compare opinion
polls or collect data from various time periods. If this hypothesis proves
false, then this criticism has been undermined and it is more likely that the
press freedom is a result of constitutional protections. Another hypothesis
could be that any differences are actually caused by a more widespread
social acceptance of criticism of the government; some societies may view
critical analysis a positive trait for the press and will reward contrarian news
outlets with increased readership regardless of the legal framework. To test
91
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this hypothesis, an experiment could be devised to survey different
societies’ view of the proper role of the press and compare these results
with the presence or absence of an explicit constitutional freedom or even
the existence of laws limiting freedom of the press.
The benefit of the more generalized theory about constitutional
freedoms is that it will also allow comparisons between countries other than
the United States and England. Another way to test the theory then is to
compare countries with constitutional rights similar to the First Amendment
to countries not just with no explicit right, such as England, but also to
countries with specific controls over the media, such as Iran. Governments
around the world exert varying degrees of control over their local media,
and studies of press freedom in these different countries will provide a
clearer and more complete picture of the influence of the First Amendment.
3. Hypotheses for the intellectual property example
A similar process can be used to infer hypotheses about the degree
of incentives that intellectual property laws have over creation. First an
operational definition must be devised for the term “incentive”. In this
case, incentive can be the number of patents and copyrights that are issued
either by governments’ patent or copyright offices.92 Because some
countries do not have IP or equivalent offices, another definition for
international study may be the number of creative products, such as books,
CDs, or technological developments that are produced for the market.
While critics may disagree with these definitions, they will still be able to
understand and asses the research.
After incentive has been defined, it is possible to infer a hypothesis
to test the concept. A first hypothesis could be that a longer duration of the
limited monopoly protection provided by copyright law will provide more
incentive to create; if IP laws provide incentives to create, then stronger IP
laws should provide increased protection and thus more incentives. One
way to test this hypothesis is by comparing the numbers of copyrights
sought before and after copyright protections were extended by twenty
years in 1998 to include the life of the author plus 70 years. But this test
alone is not sufficient to support or undermine the theory. Assuming the
92
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number of copyrights issued increased after the passage of the extension,
other factors may have influenced the change; for example, the DMCA,
which criminalizes decryption devises used to pirate copyrighted material,
may have increased the value of the copyright independent of the change in
duration, or the two laws may somehow interact to produce results that
neither would have alone. But even if the results show no change in the
number of copyrights issued, those results are not definitive on their own. It
is possible that the incentive provided by copyright law maximizes at 50
years after the author’s death so the extension had no overall effect even
though other changes in duration would have changed the results.
Hence, it is necessary to infer other critical hypotheses to test the
theory. For example, production of creative material can be compared
between the United States and China, which does not have the same level of
IP protection. The generalized theory allows study in countries operating
under various IP regimes to provide a more precise understanding of the
incentives provided by the laws. Other beneficial hypotheses may address
areas in which people create without IP protection in an environment in
which protections may be available. For example, while academic journals
sell their publications, the individual authors rarely receive a direct financial
benefit from producing work. Similarly, a recent study explored aspects of
the fashion industry in which piracy of designs is common, yet designers
rarely seem to enforce their IP rights.
C. Testing the hypothesis package
Once a set of critical hypotheses have been inferred from the
generalized theory, the hypotheses must be rigorously tested using
appropriate research designs. Application of proper experimental design to
empirical legal scholarship has been debated extensively. Although the
details of research design are beyond the scope of this paper, for the sake of
completeness this section will briefly outline some of the basic concepts.
Empirical legal studies are generally conducted for three reasons: to
collect data, to summarize data, or to make descriptive or causal
inferences.93 Because the legal community performs many activities that
produce huge amounts of raw statistical data, the mere collection of the data
is useful; but researchers must compile and organize the information so it
can be used for future analysis.94 Summarizing the data in a comprehensive
but manageable format is also beneficial so the information can be
understood quickly. But the most beneficial purpose of empirical research
is to draw causal inferences---that is, past outcomes can be used to infer
93
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future results.95 Scholars can use information about the past to make two
types of inferences about future events: descriptive inferences (predictions
made about an entire population based on data gathered from a smaller
sample set) and causal inferences (determinations of the factors that
influence a given outcome). A researcher may make a descriptive inference
about future events after studying how the opening of a large factory affects
a small nearby town. The results can be used to surmise how other
communities will deal with nuisance disputes in the future.96 A causal
inference could be useful to determine whether affirmative action laws have
been a contributing factor to any change in the number of black lawyers.97
1. Quasi-experiments
After the goal of a particular research project has been identified, an
appropriate design can be selected. A research design is the initial plans
that provide the structure for the project and are generally categorized into
three groups: true (or randomized) experimental designs, quasiexperimental designs, and non-experimental designs. Research using
randomized experimental design (the gold-standard in research design) is
used to establish whether a given treatment causes a specific effect: i.e., if X
treatment is applied, then Y should result. But to reinforce the analysis of
the causal effect, the corollary must also be true: i.e., if X treatment is not
applied, then Y should not result. To make these parallel determinations,
subjects from a common population are randomly assigned to either a
treatment or a control group; subjects in the first group receive the
treatment, whereas subject in the other group do not. Because subjects are
assigned to the two groups at random, they are assumed to be essentially the
same, or equivalent. A randomized experiment provides evidence in favor
of a hypothesis when the predicted result occurs more often in the treatment
group than the control. These types of experiments have high internal
validity; that is, the treatment employed was probably the cause of the effect
observed.
But because it is often inappropriate or impossible to randomly
assign subjects to study legal concepts, empirical legal scholarship
generally employs types of quasi-experiments, devised by Professors
Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley.98 These designs resemble true
95
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experiments, but without randomized assignment.
The lack of
randomization means that quasi-experiments generally have lower internal
validity than randomized experiments; it cannot be definitively determined
whether an observed outcome was caused by the study’s treatment or by a
threat to the validity caused by an unidentified influence present in one
group but not the other.99 Hence, in all quasi-experiments it is important to
identify possible threats to internal validity.100
Researcher can control for threats to internal validity by utilizing
one of three general strategies: relabeling, substitution, or elaboration.101
Relabeling is used when the threat results from a mislabeled effect; that is,
when the cause of an effect is attributed to the treatment when, in fact, it
was influenced by a third factor.102 One way to cure this problem,
therefore, is to just relabel the effect to better describe the true influences.103
Substitution, the second strategy for ruling out a threat, is when a
measurement that is subject to the threat is replaced by one that is not; for
example, by using a randomized experiment rather than a non-randomized
design to overcome selection bias.104 Finally, elaboration removes a threat
to validity by adding additional comparisons to the experiment to try to
disentangle the effect being observed from the threat.105
Several different forms of quasi-experiments have been devised with
differing threats to the internal validity. Some of the most popular (and
most valid forms) used in empirical legal scholarship involve
“nonequivalent groups,” in which intact groups, such as states, cities,
99
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judicial jurisdictions, etc., are selected and presumed to be similar (but not
equivalent as they would be if randomly assigned).106 The Interrupted
Time-Series with Comparison Series (“Comparison Series”) approach
compares similar groups both before and after a treatment, such as a new
law or a new Supreme Court decision.107 If the two groups are substantially
similar before the law is passed, and the observations being measured are
the same pretreatment but diverge posttreatment, it is reasonable to
conclude that the law affected the measurement. Even so, plausible
alternative explanations, such as a change in other local conditions or
changes in other laws, should always be explored.
Professors Albert Yoon’s and Tom Baker’s empirical analysis of the
effects of a New Jersey offer-of-judgment court rule is a recent example of
a Comparison Series research design.108 Under the New Jersey litigation
rule that they studied, either party to a civil suit could offer a settlement to
the opposing party; if the party receiving the offer refuses but goes on to
lose the case, that party must pay all litigation expenses including attorney
fees that were incurred after the offer was made.109 Originally the rule set a
cap on the attorney fees at $750, but the cap was later removed in
amendments to the statute. The professors collected data from before and
after the rule was revised to see if the increased cost-shifting associated
with the amendment had an effect on settlement rates. To fully analyze the
effects of the rule, the study analyzed data from in-court trials as well as
from out-of-court settlements.110 But because settlement information is
usually not publicly available, Yoon and Baker arranged with a major
American insurance company to use their confidential settlement data.111
The study was designed so that the time period observed extended an equal
duration before and after that change in law.112 The dataset also included
information from five other states other than New Jersey to serve as the
control group---these other states did not change their offer-of-judgment
rules during this time period.113 Suits filed in New Jersey comprised nearly
106
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20% of the data that the insurance company supplied.114 The study
concluded that removing the cap did not increase the number of settlements,
but did decrease the average time to resolve a suit.
Yoon and Baker approached the data using what they called an
economic approach.115 If the researchers were able to run a randomized
experiment, they would have randomly assigned subjects to control and
treatment groups that were equivalent in every respect except for the
variable being tested, in this case the cap on damages. But because it was
impossible to randomly assign citizens to either a city with or without the
new rule, the researchers compared suits from a control group that consisted
of states with similar demographics and size to suits from New Jersey (the
treatment group).116 The control states did not have a change in their offerof-judgment rules, but the treatment state did. In this way, the researchers
made the quasi-experiment as close to a true experiment as possible by
limiting the number of unexpected or exogenous factors that could
influence the results.
But Comparison Series design is only one type of quasi-experiment.
Other variations may be more appropriate depending on the situational
limitations, such as if only one group can be observed,117 or if only posttests
can be conducted.118 Similarly, other designs can be used with various
analytical strengths and weaknesses, and using them in combination can
strengthen confidence in causal inferences.119
2. Adopting research design to empirical legal scholarship
Professors Epstein and King have proposed a method for empirical
legal scholarship based on the existing methodological rules applied in the
social sciences.120 They propose the following procedure for legal
researchers: (1) develop research questions that contribute to existing
knowledge and improve the real world; (2) formulate well-reasoned
hypotheses about how societies will react if the theories are true; (3) bolster
the theory by developing rival hypotheses that test the accuracy of the
original theory; (4) use valid and reliable measurements used to test the
hypotheses; and (5) select the appropriate observations to include in the
study.121 They also suggest that the legal academy should adopt an
114
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infrastructure that is more conducive to empirical work by offering more
courses to teach law students how to properly conduct empirical research,
train law professors about empirical techniques and provide more resources
to use these skills, and create more expert review for empirical articles
submitted to law reviews.122
Professors Epstein and King also note the importance of articulating
the methods used as precisely as possible. An experiment does not provide
any value to the field if readers cannot decipher how a test was performed;
results alone are meaningless without an explanation of how they were
achieved. A test is useful when it rules out competing theories, but if it is
not clear how a test is performed, hypotheses are not ruled out because
readers cannot determine if the conclusions are based on the effects being
studied or an unarticulated internal design flaw. Negative tests results may
be caused by an incorrect auxiliary theory rather than a failure of the theory
being examined. But if the methods are not clearly articulated, it is
impossible to tell if the theory is wrong or if it is relying on a poor
supporting hypothesis. Essentially the author of a study that does not fully
explain the method used is asking readers to simply trust the author without
ever verifying the conclusions.
3. Replicability
A related reason to fully articulate the experimental methods is so
the test can be repeated by others to determine whether the study measured
a real event or if another factor may have influenced the outcome. The
results from a single experiment may reflect the phenomenon being studied
but they also could reflect a chance outcome or a variable that the designer
did not anticipate. For example, study results that are based on survey
questions may be influenced by the medium; survey results may differ
depending on whether they were gathered online, over the telephone, or on
paper. More subtle details can also influence the data such as the color of
the background or the text (participants in the study may have had a harder
time reading light colored text against a light background). But it cannot be
determined from the single experiment alone if the results are a reflection of
the variables being manipulated, random happenstance, or a third
unaccounted for factor. Hence, replication is essential. As a study is
replicated several times, researchers can have more confidence that the
outcomes are the result of the variables being studied and not just a random
occurrence. But researchers wishing to repeat the study require detailed
instructions to ensure their results are not influenced by other outside
122
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factors. More general descriptions of methods are more prone to lead
subsequent researchers astray.
Professor Robert Thompson’s empirical analysis of courts’
willingness to pierce the corporate veil in corporate liability cases is an
excellent example of a legal study with a detailed description of its
methods.123 Because of the interest in the topic and general confidence in
the results, this study has become well-cited and has been referenced by
both trial and appellate courts in federal and state cases. Thompson spends
several pages of his article providing details about how he performed his
research. The article first described the Westlaw searches he conducted to
collect the relevant court decisions. He then explains that the original
search results needed to be vetted to ensure that the cases that resulted from
the search were actually related to corporate law.124 Finally, the article
elucidates the specific information gleaned from each case.125 Overall, this
description gives readers a detailed roadmap of the data collection process
and how the results were analyzed.
But to make this study more easily replicated, it would be helpful to
add still more detail about the methods, in particular, how the cases were
vetted to ensure they focused on the correct topic. While the article
precisely describes the specific searches conducted, it does not completely
explain how the results were filtered. It states that cases “that did not
address corporate law” were eliminated from the study, but before
subsequent researchers can replicate this study, they would still need to
know how Thompson defined “corporate law,” and how it was determined
what the case “addressed.” The article does not explain whether his filter
allowed only corporate liability actions or if it also counted insider-trading,
antitrust, or litigation of other corporate laws. The methods section states
that Thompson’s research assistants made the final decisions about which
cases to include in the study, but does not explain how they were instructed
to make these decisions. If an appendix had been included with the exact
filtering instructions, future researchers would be able to more closely
replicate the study.
Unfortunately, even with this level of detail, follow-up studies may
not arrive at the same results if the instructions allowed the assistants to
exercise too much independent discretion to decide which cases to include;
different readers may make different decisions about close cases.126 And
without more information about the screening process, readers cannot
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determine if the results may have been influenced by the way the cases were
gathered. Although this level of methodological detail may seem trivial, it
can have profound effects on whether replication of the study will achieve
the same results and ensure the reliability of the study’s conclusions. As is
clear in the next example, one solution for this problem is to allow
subsequent researchers access to the final datasets.
Yoon’s and Baker’s study (described above), also lacks an important
element for replicability. While using the information from a large
insurance company seemed ideal because it is one of the few entities
involved in many different lawsuits that also keep detailed information
about the entire transaction, before allowing access to the data, the
insurance company required that the researchers keep the company’s
identity secret.127 So even though the methods were set out in detail (the
article describes the exact information the insurance company provided,
included a table that summarized the data that the insurance company
provided, and described the specific statistical analyses performed)128
because the dataset is confidential, subsequent investigators cannot attempt
to replicate the study.
The inability to replicate has several implications. First, the study
may have basic math errors that can not be checked. Clearly Yoon and
Baker thoroughly tested and retested their data, but if subsequent
investigators wish to rely on this study for future experiments, they will not
have the confidence gained from analyzing the data themselves or the
ability to use different statistical analyses on the data. For example, critics
may wish to analyze some underlying assumptions on which the study is
based. Supporters of the research may wish to build on this research by
performing even more sophisticated statistical analysis than the ones run in
this study. But currently law has not adopted an accepted norm to cope
with confidential information. Confidential data is a common problem in
medical and psychological experiments because medical data is often
collected from individuals, and these fields have developed way to address
these problems. Scientists have also developed methods of untying data
from the individual from whom it was collected. Although peer-reviewed
journals in most fields will not publish an article if the data is not available
to other researchers, the data must be anonymous. This may involve
assigning identification codes for each subject that only the original
researcher can decipher.
Legal scholars performing empirical work can develop similar
requirements. The subjects of a study, including corporations, should not
be harmed by the experiment. The legal academy should therefore try to
127
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develop a system, possibly based on the systems used in other sciences,
which can safeguard subjects of studies while still allowing future study of
datasets.
D. Theory Modification
Finally, once critical hypotheses of a generalized theory have been
tested using appropriate research designs, the results should be used to
modify the theory. Construct validation is an iterative process, in which
theories are modified based on the latest empirical research and then future
research can be conducted to test the new theory. Presently, however,
empirical legal scholarship does not have a standardized system for
incorporating new empirical data into existing theories. The result is that
evidence contrary to a popular theory may be ignored or the academy may
just be slow to recognize the new data. By incorporating new empirical
data into generalized theories in a standardized manner, legal theories can
evolve to become better predictors of behavior based on governmental
policies.
Some philosophers of science believe the ultimate goal of scientific
research is to find the definitive truth about nature.129 Scientific research
adds to our knowledge of the universe and, as science progresses, scientists
come closer to the final truth. In legal studies, the goal may not be an
ultimate true law, but a more modest attempt to find the best possible set of
laws to govern a given society at a given time. Finding the best set of laws
may then be accomplished by finding “true theories” about how law
influences society. These true theories can direct lawmakers about which
laws to pass to correctly apply a policy.
But, as noted above, empirical research should not be considered the
final step in determining new policies. The quantitative analysis should be
used only to inform new policy decisions. The generalized theories can be
used to provide guidance when lawmakers approach new issues, but should
not be used as the final solutions for problems.
1. Incorporating empirical results into the theory of constitutional rights
We have already considered a theory that explicit constitutional
rights result in more freedom than if the rights were not included in a
government’s foundational document. We then inferred the hypothesis that
if the theory is true, then the press should exhibit more freedom when in a
country where it receives constitutional protections. After running several
129
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quasi-experiments testing this and rival theories, we are now faced with
new empirical data that either supports, undermines, or alters the original
theory. We can now consider how to modify the theory based on the new
information.
If the data confirms the hypothesis and has ruled out several
alternate theories, then the theory has been supported. Although a theory
can never be proven undisputedly true, the experimental results add
confidence that it is accurate. This theory can now be used to inform future
policy considerations. For example, if a nation was considering drafting a
new constitution or new constitutional amendments, the drafters should be
advised that if they include certain protections for citizens, the population is
likely to act more “free” than if those protections are left to be set out in
statutory provisions.
But even in these circumstances, researchers should not rest on their
laurels. More research can still be conducted to further refine the theory or
rule out other criticisms that had not yet been addressed. In addition, the
hypotheses discussed thus far have only addressed freedom of the press.
Future research can address other constitutional rights, such as a right to
privacy, a right to counsel in criminal proceedings, a right to due process,
etc.
If the experimental results undermine the validity of the theory,
however, then the theory should be changed to reflect the negative data. If
the results show that the press does not exhibit more freedom despite the
presence of constitutional protections, then researchers should consider
several alternative explanations. First, the operational definition of freedom
may not have been correct. Counting stories that criticize the government
may not have been an accurate way to measure freedom. Alternatively, it
could be that the constitutional theory is correct, but the experiments relied
on incorrect auxiliary theories. For instance, it may be that the experiments
relied on theories about statistical techniques that are not accurate in this
context. In any event, it is necessary to more fully explore the results and
change the general theory to reflect the new data.
Most likely, however, is that the data will provide inconclusive
results. The data may show that constitutional rights provide more freedom,
but only with regard to certain rights or in certain cultures. If a culture is
intrinsically adverse to criticism of authority, protections for the press may
not produce any change in behavior. Similarly, a right for free speech may
provide more robust results than a right not to quarter militia in one’s home.
By exploring these possibilities, the theory will become more refined and
provide a better understanding of the field.
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2. Incorporating empirical results into the theory of intellectual property
rights
A similar procedure can be used to assess the generalized theory about
the incentives provided by IP law. If it turns out that stronger IP laws result
in an increase in the number of copyrights and patents, then those results
reinforce the theory that IP creates an incentive to create. If, on the other
hand, the experiments provide contrary results, then it is necessary to
reassess the theory. It may be that incentives should not be measured by the
number of copyrights and patents issued, but rather by the number for
which people apply. Or, perhaps, it may be better to use several measurable
indicators to get a fuller picture. Negative results may also mean that the
theory being studied relied on faulty auxiliary theories, such as financial
gains are the only motivations that IP law provides or that creators desire.
Finally, it may be that the theory itself is incorrect and that IP protections do
not have an influence on innovations.
But again, it is most likely that the results show that the theory is
partially correct, but needs refinement. For instance, it may turn out that the
motivation provided by IP law experiences diminishing returns. That is, a
certain level of protection will spur creation, but the marginal benefits
decrease after a certain level of protection is provided.
CONCLUSION
By incorporating concepts of measurement developed in social sciences,
empirical legal scholars can better assess the impact of the unobservable
constructs that underlie modern legal theory. Specifically, the notion of
construct validation can be adopted from psychology to law to allow a
standardized approach to the modification of legal theory to reflect updated
understandings of how laws impact societies based on empirical
observations. These modified theories, which are based on quantitative
observations, can then better inform policymakers’ qualitative decisions.

